We examine whether the market under free entry with a certain entry cost can recover the revenue loss following tariff reduction on an intermediate input. We show that there are four possible ranges of entry cost, from high to low, with four different revenue implications following a reduction in tariff: (i) both tariff revenue and profit tax revenue increase without raising the rate of profit tax; (ii) tariff revenue declines but total revenue increases as the increase in profit tax revenue dominates the reduction in tariff revenue; (iii) revenue loss can be compensated by increasing the rate of profit tax; (iv) compensation is not possible with a non-distortionary profit tax.
Introduction
Recovering any revenue loss due to the reduction in import duties has been one of the major concerns of many developing economies as most of them have relied historically on import duties as a primary source of government revenue. For instance, in Seychelles, Madagascar, Swaziland and Maldives, in 2000, import duties accounted for more than 50% of total tax revenue, while these figures were 26% for India and 20% for Philippines (see Table 1 below). While developing countries have, over the years, undertaken significant cuts in tariffs, their average tariff rates are still quite high. Pakistan, for example, cuts its maximum tariff from 45% to 30% in 1999, having reduced the ratio of import duties to import value over the previous decade from 42% to 22%; substantial reductions, but clearly far from full liberalization (Keen and Ligthart, 2002) . The major concern of these countries towards full trade liberalization is how to make up the shortfall in tariff revenue (if there is any) through other compensatory taxes while making neither producers nor consumers worse-off in the post-liberalization period. While there are some attempts to address this question, pervious literature has mainly focused on perfectly competitive product markets (see, e.g., Michael et al, 1993 , Hatzipanayotou et al, 1994 and Keen and Ligthart, 2002 , Emran and Stiglitz, 2004 . This literature aims at uncovering the kinds of tax reform along with tariff reductions that will raise welfare with or without looking into the revenue implications 1 . Further, despite the large share of intermediate inputs in the developing countries imports (see López and Panagariya, 1992) , little effort has been paid on the imports of intermediate goods while devising tarifftax reform strategies. What little effort has been made in this direction again mostly occurs under perfectly competitive settings (see e.g., López and Panagariya, 1992; Panagariya, 1992) . Therefore, the pervious works may not be appropriate in markets where the firms have significant market power.
The purpose of this paper is to overcome these above-mentioned limitations of the previous works. Specifically, we consider revenue implications of tariff reduction on the intermediate goods in an imperfectly competitive product market. Though, we consider that the firms have market power in the product market, we allow for entry in our analysis and determine the equilibrium number of firms endogenously. In this framework, we seek to examine when the government needs to rely on another form of taxation to compensate any shortfall in tariff revenue and if needed, whether profit tax 2 on firms can be used as a compensatory measure or the government needs a more distortionary forms of taxation.
We show that depending on the cost of entry there are four different revenue implications following a tariff reduction on the intermediate product: (i) both tariff revenue and profit tax revenue increase without raising the rate of profit tax; (ii) tariff revenue declines but total revenue increases as the increase in profit tax revenue dominates the reduction in tariff revenue; (iii) total revenue loss can be compensated by increasing the rate of profit tax; (iv) compensation is not possible with a non-distortionary profit tax.
Recently, Mujumder (2004) and Haque and Mukherjee (2004) have also considered revenue implications of tariff reduction in an imperfectly competitive market with a given number of firms. However, unlike them, the present paper considers entry of firms in the product market and show that entry of firms significantly alters the results of those previous 1 In an interesting paper, Emran and Stiglitz (2004) looks at the welfare worsening implications of revenue-neutral increase in VAT along with a reduction in trade taxes in the presence of an informal economy. 2 As argued in Mujumder (2004) , consumers may oppose to more distortionary forms of taxation as a compensatory measure since firms appropriate a substantial share of benefit of the tariff reduction through higher profit. This may justify the government's reliance on profit tax as a compensatory measure.
works. 3 So, while those works may be relevant for a short-run analysis, this paper provides a long-run effect of the problem. Our result suggests that in the long-run, the market itself might take care of the consequences of tariff reduction and the government does not need to rely on any other forms of taxation to maintain its total revenue while making neither producers nor consumers worse-off in the post-liberalization period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a very simple model to show the free entry equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the effect of tariff reduction. In Section 4, we seek to provide some empirical evidence consistent with our results. Section 5 concludes.
The model
Consider a small open economy with an industry with large number of firms. We assume that the firms are symmetric. That is, they all have the same cost function and import a certain key input. For simplicity, we assume that one unit of output requires one unit of input. The cost of assembling each unit is assumed to be identical across firms and for simplicity, assumed to be zero. There is an ad valorem tariff t imposed on each unit of input. Let denote output of firm i , where . Therefore, marginal cost of the i th firm is . We assume that the aggregate demand for the industry's product is represented by the inverse demand function:
where the notations have usual meanings. We assume that the firms produce in a market with free entry and each producer incurs certain cost of entry, . Firm's profit is taxed at a rate . Firms will continue to enter the market until the profit-after-tax equals the entry cost.
2 k 1 , 0 T 5 So, the free-entry equilibrium, which determines the equilibrium number of firms in the industry, is given by the following zero-profit condition:
3 Though Buffie and Spiller (1986) and Eldor and Levin (1990) had also considered trade liberalizaion in an imperfectly competitive market, their focus were not on the revenue implications of trade liberalization. 4 Needless to say, this assumption of zero cost of assembly does not affect our qualitative results. 5 Note that the entry cost in our analysis does not fall under profit tax. Hence, this cost of entry can be thought of as the opportunity cost or the disutility associated with investment in this industry, which may be due to corruption in
where . The optimal output and gross profit of the th firm, are
Using the free entry equilibrium in (2), we get the equilibrium number of firms, total output and the industry profit respectively as:
It is clear from (3) and (4) that tariff reduction increases both output and profit of each firm and reduces price of the product as long as the number of firms remain fixed. As we allow for free entry into the market, new firms will continue to enter the market until the industry reaches its equilibrium where profit after tax remains equal to the entry cost, k 2 , and individual producer's welfare in the equilibrium would remain unchanged. This will increase the equilibrium number of firms, total output and the gross industry profit as shown in (5) - (7), leaving equilibrium output and profit of each producer unaffected.
Effect of tariff reduction
Following the foregoing results, we can say that tariff reduction would make the consumers better off. Hence, the government can confine its attention only on its revenues:
tariff revenue, profit tax revenue and total revenue. Hence, the government's objective is to satisfy the following: tariff revenue, profit tax revenue and total revenue in the postliberalization are at least no less than their respective pre-liberalization level. Below, we establish the conditions under which the government may, or may not, need to turn to nondistortionary taxation (here, we consider profit tax) to recover the revenue loss, if there is any, due to tariff reduction.
the economy that creates positive disutility to the producers. There may be certain types of fixed costs, which fall under profit tax. However, inclusion of those fixed costs does not affect our qualitative results.
First, we see whether there is any possibility that tariff revenue might increase or stay the same due to the reduction in tariff (from t B to t A ) even without changing the profit tax, T.
This gives us the following condition:
where the subscript A ( B ) is attached to a variable to denote its post-liberalization (preliberalization) state. Tariff reduction implies
Note that tariff reduction reduces tariff revenue for a given number of firms (i.e.,
) if and only if
We assume that condition (9) holds throughout our analysis. Note that if (9) is satisfied, it ensures positive output of the entering firms (see (3)). Writing out the expressions for and , and utilizing (5), (6) and (9), the condition of increase in tariff revenue due to the tariff rate reduction (as in (8)) provides us with a critical level of entry cost, , as follows: 
It is easy to verify from (10) and (12) In the foregoing analysis, we have established that for any entry cost, , the government does not need to increase profit tax. Rather, the market itself compensates and total revenue increases due to tariff rate reduction. On the one hand, given a profit tax rate, equilibrium number of firms increases while individual firm's equilibrium profit remains the same, which causes gross industry profit and profit tax revenue to increase. On the other hand, negative effect of tariff reduction is offset by increase in import demand due to higher profitability arising from cost reduction and more firms are producing in the industry. 
Condition (14) The reason for the above finding is easy to understand. For very low levels of entry cost closed to zero, reduction in tariff does not change the profit scenario since the corresponding equilibrium profit is also closed to zero, leaving the economy with a negligible increase in profit tax revenue that would never be sufficient to recover the loss in tariff revenue. In this situation, the government can never compensate even by increasing a nondistortionary tax. But, as the entry cost gets bigger, profits start increasing leading to increase in profit tax revenue, and beyond a certain entry cost increase in the profit tax rate would lead to sufficient increase in profit tax revenue that would compensate any loss in tariff revenue.
So, in this situation, the government can recover the losses by increasing the profit tax rate.
Some Evidences
In the foregoing analysis, we examine whether the market under free entry with a certain entry cost can recover the revenue loss following tariff reduction on an intermediate input. We show that there are four possible ranges of entry cost, sufficiently high to low, with four different revenue implications following a reduction in tariff: (i) both tariff revenue and profit tax revenue increase without raising the rate of profit tax; (ii) tariff revenue declines but total revenue increases as the increase in profit tax revenue dominates the reduction in tariff revenue; (iii) revenue loss can be compensated by increasing the rate of profit tax; (iv) compensation is not possible with a non-distortionary profit tax. In this section, we look at the available data and see whether our results are empirically consistent.
In Table 2 , we report the data for average tariff rate, tariff revenue and total tax revenue (deflated by GDP deflator) for 1980 and 2000 from World Bank CDROM 2002. We compare the data points with 20-year gap for two reasons: first, most of the liberalizing countries have started tariff reduction during the early 80's (Greenaway et al, 2002) ; second, tariff reduction needs long time-lag to have impact on both tariff revenue and tax revenue. In the last three columns of Table 2 , we report the direction of movements of tariff rate, tariff revenue and total tax revenue, where 'up' means the increase and 'down' means the decline in the value from 1980 to 2000. to be a reasonable proxy for entry costs in an economy 7 ; where lower score means the higher corruption and vice -versa. The data for corruption are taken from International County Risk Guide (ICRG) and averaged over 1984 -2000 8 . These are indices that assess the corruption level by ranking countries according the extent to which corruption is perceived to exist within the political system. After collecting the data for all the relevant variables for our analysis without any missing observations, we end up having only 23 countries in our sample (see in Table 2 ).
We find that for the countries with higher levels of corruption, i.e., 2.08 -2.80 (e.g., Pakistan, Philippines, and India with the exception of Jamaica), tariff reduction (increase) from 1980 to 2000 is followed by the increase (decline) in both tariff revenue and tax revenue. For an intermediate but relatively large corruption level, i.e., 2.81 -3.00 (e.g., Turkey, Thailand, Peru, Tunisia, and Uruguay with the exception of Venezuela), tariff reduction (increase) from 1980 to 2000 is followed by the decline (increase) in tariff revenue but increase (decline) in total tax revenue. For the ranges of low corruption 3.03 -6.00, we get a mixed picture where for some countries (e.g., Singapore, Israel, Nicaragua, New
Zealand, and Canada) tariff reduction (increase) from 1980 to 2000 is followed by the decline (increase) in tariff revenue but increase (decline) in total tax revenue and for other countries (e.g., Bahamas, Argentina, Iran, Madagascar, and South Africa) tariff reduction (increase) from 1980 to 2000 is followed by the decline (increase) in both tariff revenue and tax revenue, again with some exceptions (Sri Lanka, Jordan, and USA).
It may be noted that our empirical analysis has got several qualifications. First, as we seek to show the evidence consistent with our analyses in Sections 3 and 4, we do not deeply explore the countries with exceptions 9 , which needs further research. Rather we show that there is a broad indication that our analyses can explain the implications of tariff reduction in different countries with different market entry costs. Second, ideally we should look at the data for input tariff rate, input tariff revenue and the summation of input tariff revenue and profit tax revenue in order to find the empirical consistency of our results. But none of these data are available to the best of our knowledge and instead we end up with collecting average tariff rate and tariff revenue (both of which include imports of intermediate goods, capital 7 There might be some other components of entry costs in an economy, e.g., cultural costs, lack of infrastructure, bureaucratic inefficiency, or institutional rigidity. However, we believe that corruption is a major component of entry costs. 8 1984 is the starting year for ICRG Corruption Index. 9 Jamaica, Venezuela, Sri Lanka, Jordan, and USA goods and output), and total tax revenue (that includes tariff revenue, profit tax revenue and other revenues). Third, the entry costs may be high in the countries with lower corruption (e.g., Jamaica) due to the other possible components of entry costs (e.g., cultural costs, lack of infrastructure, bureaucratic inefficiency, or institutional rigidity). For example, most of the countries with exception (Jamaica, Venezuela, Sri Lanka, and Jordan) other than USA are developing countries leading us to believe that Infrastructural and other costs may play a vital role in these countries. Thus, both the second and third qualifications may explain the countries with exceptions.
Conclusion
While the tariff revenue forms a significant of government revenue in developing countries, the literature on trade liberalization does not pay attention on revenue consequences of a tariff rate reduction when there is entry in the market. We examine the effect of tariff reduction on government revenue under free entry.
We show that for sufficiently large entry cost, a tariff reduction will always accompany higher tariff revenue and profit tax revenue due to the entry of new firms in the industry. So, in this situation, the market will itself compensate for any shortfall in revenue due to tariff reduction. For intermediate but relatively large entry costs, tariff reduction will reduce tariff revenue but will increase profit tax revenue in way so that total revenue increases. Hence, even in this situation, government does not need to interfere with other compensatory taxes. For intermediate but relative low entry costs, we find that tariff reduction reduces total revenue of the government which can be compensated by increasing the rate of profit tax. Lastly, if the entry cost is very small, we show that the government cannot compensate the loss of total revenue following a tariff reduction with a nondistortionary profit tax. Hence, in this situation, the government may need to depend on other distortionary taxes to compensate its loss of revenue.
The novelty of our analysis, though very simple, is that it shows some new policy implications. The early literature has mainly dealt with the possible conditions where nondistortionary taxes may be sufficient to recover any revenue losses due to tariff reduction. In this paper, we show that in the long run, the market may compensate the loss of tariff revenue by attracting new firms in the industry. So the government may not need to use other taxes as a compensatory measure. We find that only if the entry cost is very small, the government needs to rely on other distrotionary taxes to compensate the loss of revenue following tariff reduction.
Finally, we look at the available data on average tariff rate, tariff revenue and total tax revenues in countries ordered with a proxy of entry cost (i.e., corruption) and find that our results are broadly consistent with empirical evidence.
